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Abstract
Using a large information Bayesian VAR, we approximate the flow of informa-
tion received by economic agents to investigate the effects of government spending.
We document robust evidence that insufficiency of information in conventional
models could explain inconsistent results across samples and identifications (Re-
cursive Structural VAR and Expectational VAR). Furthermore, we report hetero-
geneous effects of government spending components. While aggregate government
spending does not appear to produce a strong stimulative effect with output mul-
tiplier around 0.7, government investment components have multipliers well above
unity. Also, state and local consumption, which captures investment in education
and health, elicits a strong response.
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1 Introduction
The severity and duration of the economic downturn stemming from the 2007-2008
global financial crisis has been unprecedented in recent history. With conventional mon-
etary policy instruments facing a binding zero lower bound, fiscal policy has experienced
renewed interest as a tool for economic stabilisation and growth. In the immediate after-
math of the financial crisis, many developed countries implemented large fiscal stimulus
packages. Subsequently, the protracted economic stagnation coupled with high levels of
public debt in many countries has raised questions about the long-run sustainability of
government budgets and focused attention on fiscal adjustment measures.
Ideally, policy makers would like to engineer stimulus packages that elicit strong
positive responses from the economy, and fiscal adjustments that result in only mild
contractionary effects. Hence, the timing and composition of fiscal maneuvers have
been intensely debated (see Alesina et al. (2012), and Blanchard and Leigh (2013)). In
particular, during the recent downturn much attention has been devoted to government
investment, such as in infrastructure, aimed at stimulating economic activity (see e.g.,
Fernald (1999) and Leeper et al. (2010)).
Unfortunately, academic research has provided no clear guidance on the macroeco-
nomic impact of fiscal shocks, with disagreement on the size and even the sign of the
responses of private aggregate demand components. Importantly, there is still a high
degree of uncertainty regarding the potentially heterogeneous macroeconomic effects of
different fiscal instruments and their compatibility with policy objectives.
Policy-makers often use multipliers as summary measures of the response of macroe-
conomic variables to fiscal instruments such as government spending components, trans-
fers and taxes. As a result, the empirical measurement of multipliers has been a major
objective for research on fiscal policy. While different identification strategies and em-
pirical settings have been used to isolate fiscal shocks and to estimate their effects, to
date a consensus view has not emerged. Reported government spending multipliers are
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vastly different across identifications, highly unstable and sensitive to the choice of sam-
ple periods, ranging from around 0.6 to 1.8. The empirical literature in this area is vast
and a detailed review is beyond the scope of this paper. Recent surveys on government
spending multipliers can be found in Ramey (2011b), Hall (2009) and Parker (2011).1
This paper uses a large information approach to make two main contributions to
the literature on government spending multipliers: (1) we examine informational insuf-
ficiency as the potential source of inconsistencies in previously reported results; and (2)
we investigate the heterogeneous effects of different components of government spending.
In particular, we disaggregate US government spending into consumption and investment
components of federal defense, federal non-defense, and state and local spending. As a
result, we outline a more complete and coherent picture of the macroeconomic effects
of government spending shocks on a comprehensive set of macroeconomic variables.
A key understanding underlying modern economic theory is that agents base their
decisions on all information currently available to them. This crucial fact, well embedded
in stylised economic models, has been generally overlooked in empirical research. In
fact, prior literature in empirical fiscal policy has mostly used small information sets
and a marginal approach to measure the effects of a change in government spending (see
Christiano et al. (1996)).
An obvious requirement for the empirical analysis to be meaningful is that the vari-
ables incorporated in the model convey all of the relevant information available to eco-
nomic agents. Therefore, we apply a comprehensive large information approach with full
Bayesian VAR techniques to study the economic effects of fiscal policy shocks. As shown
1From a theoretical point of view, the effects of an increase in government spending are ambiguous
and model dependent. While the neoclassical Real Business Cycle (RBC) and the old Keynesian and
neo-Keynesian models are broadly consistent with regard to the effect of expansionary government
spending on output, they reach different conclusions on the magnitude of the multiplier based on the
sign of the response of consumption, investment and real wages. In particular, the RBC model generally
predicts that consumption is negatively related to government spending while the Keynesian and some
neo-Keynesian models predict a positive relation (e.g., Baxter and King (1993), and Gal´ı et al. (2007)).
A large number of recent theoretical papers have studied the effectiveness of an increase in government
spending in various settings (see Woodford (2011), Hall (2009), Christiano et al. (2011), Monacelli and
Perotti (2008), Corsetti et al. (2011), among others).
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by Banbura et al. (2010), a Large Bayesian VAR allows the econometrician to signifi-
cantly expand the dataset in order to analyse shocks, possibly aligning the information
set used in the econometric analysis with that of economic agents.2
There are three possible explanations for the inconsistent results previously reported
in the literature on government spending. First, the identification of fiscal shocks is
challenging due to potential anticipation effects of fiscal policy changes and their lagged
implementation, as highlighted by Ramey (2011a). Second, aggregate spending may
conceal changes in the composition of government spending over time. In fact, policy-
makers can activate a variety of fiscal instruments including government spending com-
ponents, and each may elicit potentially different effects. Finally, a growing number of
papers convincingly point out that government spending multipliers are not structural
constants, but rather the responses of endogenous variables to shocks in government
spending. As such, there is no single government spending multiplier and its value is
likely to depend on the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy, the degree of
openness of the market, the way in which spending is financed, the budget deficit level, as
well as the economic phase. These three issues can be viewed as three facets of the same
underlying problem: the misalignment of the information sets of the econometrician and
the agents.
Our large information approach allows us to expand the econometric information set
to control for fiscal foresight, heterogeneity in fiscal instruments, and relevant omitted
variables. A key intuition is that anticipated fiscal shocks are captured by forward
looking variables (e.g., commodity prices, financial markets, inventories, consumer and
business confidence, among others).3
We document that: (1) fiscal shocks identified using a marginal approach in standard
2Banbura et al. (2010) show that by applying Bayesian shrinkage, it is possible to handle large
unrestricted VARs that allow application of the VAR framework to empirical problems that require the
analysis of large data sets, potentially solving the issue of omitted variable bias.
3The informational sufficiency of the set of variables in a VAR is testable (see Giannone and Reichlin
(2006), and Forni and Gambetti (2011)). Using this test we verify that our information set conveys
sufficient information to identify fiscal shocks.
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recursive fiscal SVARs and Expectational VARs (EVARs) are likely to have been antic-
ipated by economic agents, and are forecastable using factors extracted from a larger
information set. (2) The previously reported inconsistent multipliers can be partly ex-
plained by missing information. In fact, recursive SVARs and EVARs deliver virtually
identical estimates of dynamic responses when a large information dataset is used. Also,
government spending multipliers are stable across samples and the well known sample
instability of the estimates for the multipliers appears to be reduced to a statistically
insignificant level. (3) In the aggregate, government spending does not appear to pro-
duce a strong stimulative effect with multipliers well below unity. Consumption, private
investment and real wages are mostly unresponsive to slightly negative. The positive re-
sponses previously found in small VARs are possibly due to informational insufficiency.
(4) We estimate fiscal multipliers for disaggregated components of government spend-
ing at federal and state and local levels, and report remarkably heterogeneous dynamic
responses. In fact, non-defense and state and local components generally produce larger
responses than the defense components. Significantly, investment components have large
multipliers, hinting at a positive effect of public capital on economic activity.
Our paper is closely related, in spirit, to Forni and Gambetti (2010), in which gov-
ernment spending shocks are studied using a large factor model and sign restrictions.
The common underlying intuition is that large dimension datasets incorporating forward
looking variables are necessary to close the gap between the information sets of economic
agents and the econometrician. The advantage of using a Large Bayesian VAR is that
we are able to treat variables in a more transparent manner, bridging the gap between
different identification strategies and reconciling previously reported inconsistencies. In
fact, our model is able to nest previously used models and identifications (recursive and
expectational). More generally, factor models are less general than VAR models and
impose restricted VAR relations among variables.
Our paper adds robust evidence to the recent literature studying heterogeneous ef-
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fects of fiscal instruments. Mertens and Ravn (2013) study the effects of personal and
corporate income tax changes, while several papers study the different effects of invest-
ment and consumption, or federal and state and local government spending components,
using a small information marginal approach (for example, Perotti (2011), Pappa (2009),
Be´ne´trix (2012), and Bouakez et al. (2013)).
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the identification
of fiscal shocks and motivates our use of the large information information approach,
Section 3 introduces our large information fiscal Bayesian VAR, Section 4 presents our
empirical findings and Section 5 concludes.
2 Identification of Fiscal Shocks
Empirical identification of government spending shocks requires isolating innovations
that are uncorrelated with other contemporaneous economic shocks, and that are distinct
from systematic business cycle variations.
Prior literature on fiscal shocks using time-series techniques has almost exclusively
used small information sets, resorting to amarginal approach. Typically, in this approach
a small VAR model is developed with a core set of variables. The effects of fiscal shocks
are examined on these variables, and other variables that are added one at a time (see
Christiano et al. (1996)). This approach presents two issues: (1) the potential omission of
relevant variables; and (2) limited comparability among the impulse response functions.
These issues are related to the general problem of informational insufficiency of the
econometric model due to the misalignment of the information sets available to the
agents and the econometrician. In the case of fiscal shocks, this misalignment can be
related to missing information in the econometric model about: (1) the flow of informa-
tion about the future path of fiscal variables (fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness);
(2) heterogeneity of fiscal instruments (heterogeneity of components and instability of
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aggregate government spending); and (3) various variables interacting with fiscal policy,
such as monetary policy, credit and financial market conditions, and openness of the
markets, among others (omitted variables). This misalignment has relevant implica-
tions not only for the estimate of the transmission parameters but also for the correct
identification of fiscal shocks.
In the following subsections, we briefly discuss the identification challenges faced
by the small information marginal approach in the presence of fiscal foresight, hetero-
geneity of government spending components, and other potentially omitted variables
(see Sections 2.1 and 2.2). Then we introduce our large information approach which
addresses the problem of informational insufficiency by incorporating forward looking
macroeconomic, financial market, and business variables (see Section 2.3).
2.1 Small Information Marginal Approach
Following the influential paper of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), works using Structural
Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) have identified fiscal shocks using restrictions moti-
vated by economic theory, e.g., recursive identification (see Perotti (2005, 2008) and
Gal´ı et al. (2007)) or sign restrictions (see Mountford and Uhlig (2009)).
As summarised by Hall (2009) and Ramey (2011b), prior empirical literature using
SVARs generally finds output multipliers in the range from 0.6 to 1.8, and consumption
multipliers in the range from somewhat negative to 0.5. These studies also usually find
that a positive government spending shock raises worked hours and real wages, while
having a negligible impact on private investment.
Building on the narrative approach, Ramey (2011a) argues that estimated govern-
ment spending shocks in SVARs are likely to be anticipated. This can lead to a spurious
finding of a positive effect of government spending shocks on consumption and real
wages. Economic agents receive a constant flow of information about future changes in
fiscal policy, informed by the institutional process through which they are implemented.
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In particular, changes in fiscal policy occur after two lags: the first between the initial
proposal of a new fiscal measure and its approval (decision lag), and the second between
enactment of the legislation and its actual implementation (implementation lag). While
economic agents react to the announcement of policy changes occurring in future peri-
ods, the econometrician only observes the innovation produced in fiscal variables by the
lagged implementation of the new policy. This phenomenon, known as fiscal foresight,
poses significant challenges for identification of fiscal shocks.
VAR models always implicitly assume informational sufficiency. This implies that
structural economic shocks can be recovered as linear combinations of the residuals from
the linear projection of a vector of economic variables onto their past values. However,
in the presence of fiscal foresight, to recover the true fiscal shocks hitting the economy
the econometrician should relate present changes in macroeconomic variables to future
innovations in fiscal variables. Therefore, fiscal shocks and their dynamic responses
cannot be estimated from current and past fiscal data, as assumed in conventional
dynamic econometric models and the structural shocks are said to be non-fundamental
for the VAR specification (Hansen and Sargent (1980), Lippi and Reichlin (1993), Leeper
et al. (2013), Mertens and Ravn (2010)).4,5
Non-fundamentalness can be framed as a problem of informational insufficiency,
originating from the misalignment of the respective information sets of the econome-
trician and agents. In the context of fiscal foresight, this misalignment is due to news
flow about future policy changes conveyed by the institutional implementation process
that is not observed by the econometrician. The natural solution to deal with non-
fundamentalness is to include more information in the econometrician’s information set;
this idea underpins most of the solutions proposed in the empirical literature on fiscal
4A comprehensive review on non-fundamentalness in structural econometric models can be found in
Alessi et al. (2011).
5In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE), fiscal foresight can produce a non-invertible
moving-average (MA) component into the equilibrium process, as discussed in Leeper et al. (2013).
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shocks.6
One solution proposed in Ramey (2011a) is to augment the VAR with variables that
can proxy for changes in agents’ expectations about the present value of government
spending, developing an Expectational VAR (EVAR). In Ramey (2011a) two different
measures of expectations are proposed: a military news variable based on narrative
evidence for defense spending and a fiscal expectations variable based on the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF). Using this approach, Ramey (2011a) finds that fiscal
shocks have a positive effect on GDP upon impact, but crowd out private consumption
and investment. Other proxy variables for fiscal expectations have been proposed by
Leeper et al. (2013) using the spread between municipal and treasury bonds and Fisher
and Peters (2010) using stock returns of US defense contractors. The disadvantage of
using proxy variables for expectations is that, to some extent, whether these variables
are able to correctly capture agents’ expectations or not is a matter of assumptions.
2.2 Heterogeneity of Fiscal Shocks
Informational insufficiency can also be due to the components of government spend-
ing that could appear as potentially relevant omitted variables. First, the composition
of spending has undergone a remarkable shift through time, raising doubts about the
stability of the macroeconomic properties of the aggregate government spending vari-
able. Table 1 presents the breakdown of US government spending on consumption and
investment over the last 50 years. Defense spending has fallen from 45.7 percent of
total government spending in 1960 to 27.6 percent in 2010, while federal non-defense
6A different approach, proposed in Lippi and Reichlin (1994) consists of applying appropriate
Blaschke matrices to the VAR innovations in order to retrieve the fundamental shocks. The Blaschke
matrices transform the recovered innovations into linear combinations of past and future innovations,
allowing a non-fundamental MA representation to be mapped into a fundamental one. Mertens and
Ravn (2010) have estimated the effects of government spending shocks using Blaschke matrices. The
disadvantage of this approach is the non-uniqueness of Blaschke matrices. Additional restrictions de-
rived from theoretical models are necessary to identify the correct MA component among different
possible MA representations.
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spending has stayed at around 10 percent. During the same period, state and local
spending has increased from 45.2 percent in 1960 to 58.9 percent in 2010, with most of
the increase stemming from consumption expenditures. However, during the most recent
period (2010) continued post-9/11 military spending, crisis related fiscal stimulus and
contracting state budgets have reversed this trend, increasing the relative size of federal
spending. Investment components of spending, especially defense investment, were high
during the 1960s and subsequently declined, as also reported by Fernald (1999).7
Second, government consumption and investment includes the purchase of a large
variety of goods and services that may activate demand and supply channels differently.
In particular, civilian investment components can have a direct effect on the aggregate
production function and can be a source of externalities. Other categories of spending
such as education, healthcare and public safety can have both productive effects (e.g.,
through the accumulation of human capital) and effects on marginal rates of substitution
by entering in the utility function of economic agents. Table 1 reports the functional
decomposition of federal and state and local spending. Over the last 50 years, fed-
eral spending has tilted towards civilian spending on healthcare and public safety, and
away from defense spending. During the same time, the composition of state and local
spending shows a decline in transportation and an increase in general public service
and public safety. Education is the largest component of state and local spending at
around 43 percent. The presence of spending components with productive effects and
externalities creates challenges in understanding the channels through which spending
operates and in interpreting multipliers.
7It is worth noting that in national accounts, defense investment captures both the building of
military infrastructure, as well as the acquisition of military equipment and stockpiling of weapons that
provide a flow of future national security services but may have reduced productive effects.
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2.3 Large Information Approach
A comprehensive theoretical approach to deal with insufficient information and non-
fundamentalness has been proposed in Giannone and Reichlin (2006). The key idea
is to use large datasets to address non-fundamentalness and to detect informational
insufficiency with Granger causality tests.8 As proved in Giannone and Reichlin (2006),
structural shocks are correctly recovered using large information under the assumptions
that the shocks of interest are pervasive throughout the cross-section and that they
generate heterogeneous dynamics. The remaining shocks need not propagate too widely
and therefore, can meaningfully be considered idiosyncratic.
In our case, the intuition for this approach is that anticipated fiscal shocks can be
captured by including forward looking variables such as commodity prices, financial
markets, inventories, consumer and business confidence, among others. In addition,
we use contemporaneous restrictions to disentangle fiscal surprises from other economic
shocks (see Section 3 for details). This identification scheme for policy shocks has
been originally proposed by Sims (1988), with small VARs supplemented by financial
variables.9
Informational sufficiency and non-fundamentalness can be assessed by testing whether
the VAR residuals of the variables of interest are weakly exogenous with respect to po-
tentially relevant additional variables or factors extracted from them. The logic for this
test, proposed in Forni and Gambetti (2011), is that if additional variables contain rel-
evant information useful to forecast innovations to the economic variables of interest,
then this information may have been used by economic agents.
The most suitable econometric models to incorporate large datasets are Factor Aug-
mented VARs (e.g., Bernanke et al. (2004)), dynamic factor models (Forni et al. (2000,
2009)), and the recently proposed Large Bayesian VARs (see De Mol et al. (2008); Ban-
8Very large dataset (𝑁 ∼ 100) are considered to be a good approximation for the whole economy.
9Yang (2007) has discussed the relevance of financial variables in the identification of tax shocks,
with a small information set.
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bura et al. (2010)). In this paper we adopt a Large Bayesian VAR approach that allows
a transparent treatment of variables, facilitates a comparison of different identification
strategies, and nests different empirical models.
3 A Large Bayesian Fiscal Structural VAR
3.1 Empirical Model
A natural solution for this is to expand the information set used in the econometric
analysis. In particular, we would like to expand the set of variables to include: (1) the
components of government spending as well as other relevant fiscal variables to control
for the issue of heterogeneity of fiscal instruments and instability of the aggregate; (2) a
number of forward looking variables that may capture the flow of information received
by agents to deal with the fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness issue; and (3) other
omitted variables (e.g., variables related to financial markets, credit markets, monetary
policy, international trade, etc.) that may be relevant in determining the economic
environment and agents’ decisions.
Unfortunately, in standard VAR models, the estimation of the parameters of models
with a large number of variables is obstructed by the curse of dimensionality. Large
Bayesian VARs offer a viable solution to this problem. Banbura et al. (2010) show that
by applying Bayesian techniques, it is possible to handle large unrestricted VARs. This
allows the VAR framework to be applied to empirical problems that require large data
sets, potentially solving the issue of informational insufficiency. In particular, they show
that for the analysis of data sets characterised by strong collinearity, which is typically
the case for macroeconomic time series, it is possible to increase the cross-sectional
dimension by consistently setting the informativeness of the priors in relation to the size
of the model. Large Bayesian VARs have proven to be competitive with factor models in
terms of forecasting ability, and allow for a more flexible and transparent treatment of
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large information datasets (Banbura et al. (2010); Giannone et al. (2012); Koop (2011)).
Moreover, they have a clear interpretation in terms of factor analysis and of Mixed Thail
estimation (De Mol et al. (2008)).
We consider different specifications of the following VAR(4) model:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝐴3𝑦𝑡−3 + 𝐴4𝑦𝑡−4 + 𝜀𝑡 (1)
where 𝜀𝑡 is an n-dimensional Gaussian white noise, with covariance matrix Σ𝜀, 𝑦𝑡 is a
𝑛 × 1 vector of endogenous variable and 𝐶, 𝐴1,. . . , 𝐴4 and Σ𝜀 are matrices of suitable
dimensions containing the model’s unknown parameters. In our setting, the dimension
of 𝑦𝑡 can be large. Following Banbura et al. (2010), we embed prior beliefs in the form of
dummy observations to artificially expand the length of our sample, as done in Banbura
et al. (2010). In particular, we use a natural conjugate variant of the Minnesota priors
proposed in Doan et al. (1983) and Litterman (1979). These priors assumes that in
first approximations all the variables behave independently either as random walks or
white noises.10 We also adopt a refinement of the Minnesota prior known as sum-of-
coefficients prior (Sims (1980)).11 The informativeness of the priors, i.e., the relative
weight of priors with respect to actual observations, is controlled by hyperparameters.
In selecting the value of the hyperparameters of our priors, we adopt the pure
Bayesian method proposed in Giannone et al. (2012). From a purely Bayesian per-
spective, the informativeness of the prior distribution is one of the many unknown pa-
rameters of the model that can be inferred given the conditional posterior distribution
of the observed data. In particular, the hyperparameters can be optimally chosen by
maximising the one-step-ahead out-of-sample forecasting ability of the model. Using fre-
quentist intuition, this method effectively reduces the estimation error while generating
10This prior shrinks all VAR coefficients towards zero except for coefficients on own lags of each
dependent variable. The latter is either set to one - for those variables which are thought to be
relatively persistent - or zero, otherwise.
11This prior works to suppress initial transients, and also provides an approximate representation of
widely shared prior beliefs that unit roots are present in macroeconomic datasets.
13
only relatively small biases in the estimates of the parameters.12
In a Technical and Data Appendix, we discuss the econometric approach in detail.
Also, we present a simple model to illustrate the issue of non-fundamentalness and
motivate the use of a large information approach.
3.2 Identification
We employ two different approaches to the identification of fiscal shocks:
∙ Structural VARs (SVAR) with recursive identification, i.e., Choleski decomposition
with government spending (or its shocked component) ordered first;13
∙ Expectational VARs (EVAR) with expectational identification employing proxies
for government spending forecasts derived from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters (SPF), as in Ramey (2011a).
These two strategies are applied in both small and large cross-sectional VARs.
In our baseline SVAR models we employ recursive identification with the shocked
variable ordered first. In the large SVAR models, consistent with the intuition of Sims
(1988), the identification is due to the interaction of: (1) the incorporation of forward
looking variables and (2) the recursive identification that exploits decision lags in fiscal
policy-making to impose minimum delay restrictions. The forward looking variables con-
trol for anticipated changes in spending and possibly other variables, while the recursive
identification isolates fiscal shocks from other contemporaneous structural shocks.
In our expectational VAR models, we use SPF forecast data to directly control for
agents’ expectations of government spending, following Ramey (2011a). Unfortunately,
12The use of our Bayesian priors introduces a bias toward zero in the estimates of the VAR coefficients
and hence of the IRFs (except for coefficients on own lags of each dependent variable). For this reason,
our estimated multipliers can be better framed as lower bounds, in absolute values, on the value of the
multipliers. However, by selecting the informativeness of the priors optimally, the bias introduced is
not substantially larger than the small sample bias of the standard flat-prior VAR (see Giannone et al.
(2012)).
13A fixed ordering of the government spending components with defense spending components ordered
first does not alter the results.
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it is not possible to include these SPF forecasts in levels in the VAR, as would be natural
to do, since the base year changes several times in the sample. To overcome this issue,
the surprises in government spending are defined, following Ramey (2011a), as
Δ𝑔𝑓.𝑒𝑟𝑟.𝑡 = Δ𝑔𝑡 −Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 = (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1)− (𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 − 𝑔𝑒𝑡−1|𝑡−1) (2)
where Δ𝑔𝑓.𝑒𝑟𝑟.𝑡 is the forecast error in the growth rate of government spending, Δ𝑔𝑡 and
Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 are the realised growth rate and the forecasted growth rate one quarter before,
respectively. This definition assumes that the SPF forecasts are good proxies for the
representative agent’s expectations. Moreover, it also assumes that agents know the
value of government spending in the current quarter.
Perotti (2011) has noted that professional forecasters in SPF do not know the value
of 𝑔𝑡. For this reason he proposes to decompose these forecast errors as
Δ𝑔𝑓.𝑒𝑟𝑟.𝑡 = Δ𝑔𝑡 −Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 = (Δ𝑔𝑡 −Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡)⏟  ⏞  
time t’s surprise in Δ𝑔𝑡
+ (Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡 −Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1)⏟  ⏞  
revision of expectation of Δ𝑔𝑡
(3)
where the first term captures the realisation of government spending growth over its
expectations in 𝑡 and the second term captures the revision of the agent’s expectations
about Δ𝑔𝑡. While the first term is not in the information set of agents at time 𝑡, the
second term is the actual shock to expectations and could proxy for the news in the
information flow of agents, as proposed in neoclassical models.
In our EVAR, the forecast errors defined in eq. (2) and the expectation revision
expressed in eq. (3) are ordered first, and used as shock variables.
3.3 Data Description
Our main macroeconomic variables of interest are consumption and investment com-
ponents of federal, and state and local government spending, gross domestic product,
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the Barro-Redlick marginal tax rate, real wages, total worked hours, output per hour,
personal consumption of durables, nondurables, and services, real private investment,
real rates, and the real exchange rate. We use quarterly data from 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 in
real log per capita levels for all variables except those expressed in rates. Real rates are
measured using the three-month US Treasury Bill rate adjusted for changes in the con-
sumer price index. The Barro-Redlick marginal tax rate is the income weighted average
marginal tax rate that is made available by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
We consider the following VAR specifications:
∙ Small VAR: In the base specification, this is a 5 variable VAR with a fixed set of
variables including government spending (or one of its components), marginal tax
rate, gross domestic product, and real rates, as well as a rotating fifth variable
of interest including real wages, total worked hours, output per hour, personal
consumption of durables, nondurables, and services, real private investment, and
the real exchange rate.
∙ Large VAR: In addition to the variables in the Small VAR, this specification
includes as many forward-looking variables as possible in order to approximate
the flow of information received by economic agents. These include taxes, public
deficit, public debt, savings, credit, consumer sentiment, asset prices, inventories,
production costs, and housing among others (see Table 5 for a complete list of
variables).14 The baseline specification with aggregate government spending has 43
variables while the expanded specification with government spending components
has 48 variables.
∙ Small and Large EVARs: In the Expectational VAR specifications where the SPF
data are used, the components of government spending are combined to conform
14Following the conjecture in Banbura et al. (2010), we exclude regional and sectoral components of
macroeconomic variables as they appear to not be relevant in order to capture economy-wide structural
shocks. In robustness tests, we include many regional or sectoral variables in our Large VAR and find
unchanged responses lending support to the conjecture.
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with the level of aggregation in the SPF data.
Furthermore, we collect 128 macroeconomic variables, including sectoral components
which are used to extract commonalities using factor analysis. A brief description of
all the variables used in our study is presented in a Technical and Data Appendix. In
Table 5 we indicate the variables that we apply logarithms to, as well as the variables
with assumed random walk priors. The variables used in the various VAR specifications
are also indicated.
Our 1959Q1-2012Q1 sample period delivers a rich macroeconomic dataset, and ex-
cludes the large military spending shocks related to the Korea War and WWII. We
split this sample period into two subsamples: 1959Q1-1981Q4 and 1982Q1-2012Q1.15
The 1982Q1 split point is chosen in order to assess the subsample instability claimed in
Perotti (2008) and is consistent with a large stream of literature that finds a structural
break in the US economy in the early 1980s. This split point also enables comparability
of the SVAR and EVAR specifications.
4 The Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Shocks
In this section, we present our empirical results. First, we contrast the effects of shocks to
disaggregated components of government spending with shocks to aggregate government
spending. Second, we test the informational content of our Large VAR using factors
extracted from a large dataset of 128 macroeconomic variables. Third, we compare
SVARs with EVARs that incorporate Survey of Professional Forecasters’ expectations for
government spending. Finally, we check the robustness of our results across subsamples.
15In robustness checks we also use a shortened sample (1959Q1-2005Q4) excluding the recent financial
crisis and economic recession and obtain similar results.
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4.1 Aggregate Versus Disaggregate Government Spending
We start by examining the effects of shocks to aggregate government spending. Figure
1 compares the IRFs obtained for an aggregate government spending shock using the
standard fiscal Small VAR and our Large VAR. The dynamic responses of macroeco-
nomic variables of interest are plotted for a one percent shock in government spending.
The IRFs can be interpreted as elasticities since the variables are in log–levels.
Aggregate Spending Shocks in Small VAR. Looking at the standard fiscal
Small VAR IRFs one would conclude that a positive aggregate government spending
shock elicits a positive and sustained response from GDP and output per hour as well
as from consumption components. Also, real wages initially drop and subsequently
increase, peaking after four quarters, while worked hours start increasing after eight
quarter. Investment drops on impact and remains in negative territory for sixteen
quarters.
Aggregate Spending Shocks in Large VAR. The Large VAR recounts a different
story. An aggregate government spending shock results in a positive but short lived
stimulus in GDP and output per hour. Crucially, IRFs for consumption components
are generally unresponsive and flat if not negative. Nondurable consumption responds
mildly positive but not significantly. Similarly, real wages and worked hours do not
increase following a fiscal spending shock. At the same time, investment drops on impact,
being crowded out by government spending for the entire horizon, even though not
significantly. The income-weighted average marginal tax rate rises on impact, peaks after
a couple of quarters and then declines. Real rates drop upon impact and then recover
after a few quarters, while the real exchange rate increases on impact (appreciation) and
then stabilises after a few quarters. IRFs of the Small VAR are quite often outside the
posterior coverage intervals, and deliver biased estimations.
Different definitions of multipliers have been used in the literature. In this paper we
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focus on two commonly used ones. Impact multipliers are computed as
impactmultiplier =
Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃0
Δ𝐺0
, (4)
measures the ratio of the change in output to a change in government expenditure at
the moment the impulse to government expenditure occurs. We extend this definition
to different horizons as
periodicmultiplier(T) =
Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑇
Δ𝐺0
(5)
to provide a translation of the IRFs into dollar values. Following Ilzetzki et al. (2013),
we also define cumulative multipliers as
cumulativemultiplier(T) =
∑︀𝑇
𝑡=0(1 + 𝑖)
−𝑡Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡∑︀𝑇
𝑡=0(1 + 𝑖)
−𝑡Δ𝐺𝑡
(6)
where 𝑖 is the mean real interest rate in the sample. This measure can be thought of
as the the net present value of the cumulative change in output per unit of additional
government expenditure, also in net present value, for a given horizon 𝑇 . Since our
IRFs can be interpreted as elasticities, to compute multipliers we scale the IRFs by the
average dollar value of the variable of interest, as is done in the related literature.
Multipliers from the Large VAR are reported in Table 2. The aggregate govern-
ment spending multiplier for GDP from the Large VAR is 0.71 upon impact and the
cumulative multipliers for GDP remain positive and statistically significant for about 4
quarters (see also Figure 6, which plots cumulative multipliers for GDP). The multipliers
for durables, nondurables and services consumption are not significantly different from
zero.
In summary, aggregate government spending appears to stimulate output with a less
then unity multiplier, due to the crowding out of investment and unresponsiveness of
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consumption. These patterns seem to be closer to the effects of government spending
predicted by a neoclassical baseline model, due to the implied negative wealth effect
Baxter and King (1993) . In this perspective, the positive and persistent response of
consumption in Small VARs appears to be biased and due to informational insufficiency
(we discuss this in further detail in section 4.2).
However, the aggregate government spending shocks do not tell a complete story
since they mask the underlying heterogeneity of the dynamic responses to different
components of spending.
Disaggregate Spending Shocks in Large VAR. The IRFs for shocks to con-
sumption expenditures components of federal defense, federal non-defense and state
and local spending are presented in Figure 2. Focusing on the Large VAR IRFs, the
three components of government spending appear to induce very different reactions from
macroeconomic variables. Federal defense consumption elicits a positive, significant but
short lived response from GDP, with an impact multiplier of 0.88, while private con-
sumption is unresponsive and investment is negative. Following a federal non-defense
spending shock GDP drops (not significant), while durables consumption and invest-
ment are crowded out. Finally, state and local consumption shocks produce a slowly
increasing response from GDP, from the components of consumption as well as from
investment that peaks after about 2 to 3 years (see also Figure 6). The cumulative
multiplier for GDP increases steadily towards 2, in the long run. In addition, non-
durables and services consumption cumulative multipliers are significantly positive. It
worth noting that, as in the aggregate spending IRFs, the Small VAR delivers biased
results.
A large portion of state and local consumption is wages, as payment for services
such as education and health. This may explain the positive effect on consumption
components in the short run, and the slow growing pass-through effect on aggregate
output in the medium and long run. Furthermore, spending on education can be framed
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as investment in human capital, and while our horizon is limited to six years, our results
may hint at the long run positive stimulative effect on aggregate output.
Investment components of government spending produce starkly different effects on
the variables of interest (see Figure 3). While defense investment has a negative effect
on output, non-defense investment at federal and state and local level appears to provide
strong economic stimulus. A federal non-defense investment shock produces a slowly
rising hump-shaped response that peaks after 2 years, while the largest effect of state
and local investment is upon impact.
The GDP multipliers reported in Table 2 reflect this result with federal defense in-
vestment yielding large negative cumulative multipliers. As surprising as it may appear,
it could be explained by recalling that in national accounting purchases of military
hardware are accounted for as investment. While other forms of federal investment can
have a positive effect on aggregate output by increasing the stock of productive public
capital (e.g., infrastructure), military hardware and installations do not directly enter
the production function and only provide security services over time (a public good).
In this respect, federal defense investment can be viewed as ”thrown-into-the-ocean”
spending of the neoclassical model.
Non-military investment components result in large statistically significant impact
multipliers of 2.63 and 4.70 for state and local and federal non-defense investment, re-
spectively. In addition, federal non-defense investment has large cumulative multipliers,
even though estimated with large standard errors. The consumption IRFs and mul-
tipliers are generally close to zero and insignificant upon impact, except the durables
consumption multiplier for state and local investment. In addition, private investment
responds strongly to federal non-defense investment with multipliers well over 1. This
may suggest the activation of a supply channel possibly providing feedback and rein-
forcing the effects to the increased public capital.
Similar results on government investment have been reported in Aschauer (1989)
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and in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). Leduc and Wilson (2012) study local
multipliers for non-defense federal investment. They find that highway spending shocks
positively affect GDP on impact and also after six to eight years, but find no permanent
effect on GDP at local level. However, we cannot directly compare our aggregate results
with their local multipliers (see the discussion of the paper proposed by Giavazzi (2012)).
From a theoretical perspective, Baxter and King (1993) consider the multiplier effects
of an increase in investment in public capital in a neoclassical setting. In line with our
findings, they show that in the case of public capital that raises the marginal product of
private inputs, multipliers can be quite large, somewhere between 4 and 13 in the long
run.
Finally, we assess whether the GDP multipliers for each component are significantly
different from each other by performing pair-wise tests of differences. The results re-
ported in Table 3 show that at different horizons, many of the multipliers are statistically
different from each other.
Overall, our Large VAR uncovers multipliers that crucially depend on the component
of government spending as they manifest starkly heterogenous effects. Consumption
components appear to have short lived and relatively weak effects. State and local
consumption stands out as providing a slow growing but sustained stimulus to output,
consumption components and investment. Generally, the non-defense and state and
local components produce more positive responses while the same does not hold true for
defense components. In particular, investment components have larger multipliers than
consumption components hinting at a direct productive effect on economic activity.
4.2 Fiscal Foresight and Informational Sufficiency
The presence of fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness in the different empirical mod-
els can be examined using the information sufficiency test proposed in Forni and Gam-
betti (2011). The test can be implemented by extracting factors from a large dataset
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assumed to encompass all macroeconomic information, and checking for Granger causal-
ity of the identified fiscal shocks. The intuition supporting this test is that if the factors
contain relevant information useful for forecasting fiscal shocks, then economic agents
could have used this information to alter their behaviour prior to the realisation of the
forecasted spending shock.
We use this informational sufficiency test to assess different empirical specifications.
First, we test informational sufficiency of the Small VAR and the Large VAR. Then, we
verify the forecastability of SPF forecast errors, the “Ramey” military spending news
variable, and the residuals from a small EVAR.
We use a large dataset of 128 variables to extract five factors that explain over 99
percent of the variance in the data.16 We use these five factors to conduct Granger
causality tests on the residuals of government spending and the components of gov-
ernment spending from the Small and Large VARs for the full sample and the two
subsamples.
Table 4 reports the results for the Granger causality tests. In the Small VAR with
total government spending, Factor 3 Granger causes the residuals for the full sample as
well as for the 1959Q1 to 1981Q4 subsample. Similarly, in the Small VAR with the com-
ponents of government spending, Factor 3 appears to Granger cause the residuals from
defense, non-defense and state and local investment and state and local consumption.
In addition, Factor 4 Granger causes the residuals from defense and state and local in-
vestment, while Factor 5 those from state and local consumption and investment. Most
are significant at the 5 percent level. These results suggest that fiscal shocks are non-
fundamental in the Small VAR possibly due to fiscal foresight. Using a different test,
Forni and Gambetti (2010) report similar strong non-fundamentalness results for a 6
variable VAR.
16We used several criteria to assess the appropriate number of factors to extract, including variance
explained, the criteria proposed in Bai and Ng (2002), and the Onatski (2009) test. We chose the
largest number proposed in the different tests. Factors are extracted using an EM algorithm.
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We test whether the variables that proxy for expectations of government spending
proposed in Ramey (2011a) can convey information sufficient to correctly pin down the
timing of fiscal shocks. We conduct Granger causality tests on “Ramey” forecast errors
and VAR residuals, using SPF forecast data on federal and state and local spending, as
well as expectation revisions as defined in Perotti (2011). Overall, the factors Granger
cause the “Ramey” federal and state and local spending forecast errors mostly at 5
percent significance level. Also the Small EVAR residuals associated with government
spending forecast errors appear to be Granger caused, albeit at around 15 percent
significance level. Similarly, the expectation revisions for federal spending are Granger
caused by Factor 1 and Factor 3, while expectation revisions for state and local spending
are Granger caused by Factor 3 as well. Finally, we also conduct a Granger causality
test using the “Ramey” military spending news variable and find that it is Granger
caused by Factor 2 at the 5 percent significance level.17 These findings can either be
due to deviation from perfect information or from perfect rationality, as discussed in
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) and in Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) that report
similar results.
Although the expectation proxy variables may provide some additional information
useful to approximate the agents’ information set, this approach is most likely still not
able to correctly identify fiscal shocks. Instead, expanding the set of variables to the
Large VAR appears to provide sufficient information to correctly identify fiscal shocks,
overcoming fiscal foresight issues. Indeed, none of the factors appear to Granger cause
the Large VAR residuals of government spending in any specification or subsample.
In order to better understand these result we study the partial correlations of the
factors with the variables in the dataset. These correlations confirm the importance of
including forward looking variables in the VAR specifications in order to approximate
the agents’ information set: Factor 1 is correlated with public finances variables (debt
17The military news variable has very low predictive power for post-1955 samples, that exclude WWII
and the Korea War, as discussed in Ramey (2011a).
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and deficit) and rates; Factor 2 with commodity and producer price indices as well
as consumer sentiment; Factor 3 with taxes, public finance variables, labour and credit
market variables, inventories and money supply; Factor 4 with CEO confidence, housing
starts, industrial production and private investment; and Factor 5 with equity market
returns and industrial activity indices.18
4.3 SVAR a` la Perotti versus EVAR a` la Ramey
To test the potential source of disagreement between the SVAR and EVAR as proposed
in Ramey (2011a), we compare IRFs from recursive and expectation identifications
(incorporating SPF data) estimated using the small and large models. Informational
sufficiency of the dataset incorporated in the Large VAR would imply that the proxy
variables for expectations should not provide additional information. Provided that
fiscal shocks are correctly identified under both specifications, a Large Structural VAR
and a Large Expectational VAR should yield the same results and IRFs in statistical
terms.
The results for aggregate federal spending are shown in Figure 4.19 The IRFs show
the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to a shock in “Ramey” forecasts errors
normalised such that federal government spending peaks at one, as done in Perotti
(2011). Using this methodology allows a direct comparison of IRFs from the SVARs
and the EVARs.
The Large SVARs and EVARs deliver strikingly similar results, while the Small
SVARs and EVARs deliver different results. This suggests that missing information
may explain the different results obtained from different identifications.20 This also
18The relevance of including forward looking variables, such as commodity prices, in the VAR speci-
fication to capture agents’ expectations is recognised since the seminal work of Sims (1992). Moreover,
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argue in favour of including the path of public debt in the VAR in order to
correctly recover fiscal shocks.
19In the VAR specifications where the forecast errors are used, they are ordered first. For the federal
spending VAR, the various components of federal spending (consumption and investment components
of federal defense and non-defense) are aggregated as the SPF forecasts are at an aggregate level.
20For the sake of brevity, only federal spending results are reported. Large SVARs and EVARs for
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corroborates our findings from the Granger causality tests and provides a strong indica-
tion of the informational sufficiency of the Large SVAR specification. A complementary
possible explanation for these results, as observed in Perotti (2011) is that the strong
predictive power of “Ramey” forecast error for government spending reported in Ramey
(2011a) is partially due to the low predictive power of expected government spending
growth. The forecast error is almost equivalent to actual spending growth less some
noise.
The IRFs reported in the first two columns of Figure 4 compare results for Small and
Large SVARs and EVARs for aggregate federal spending. The Small EVAR IRFs are
similar to those reported by Ramey (2011a), but we find shallower troughs for the Large
EVAR, although not always significant. However, in the Large VARs aggregate state
and local spending shocks result in positive hump-shaped IRFs for output, consumption
and investment, as well as real wages.
Finally, we explore a different specification of the EVARs that includes agents’ ex-
pectation revisions as defined by Perotti (2011). IRFs for aggregate federal spending
are reported in the last columns of Figures 4. The shapes of the IRFs are intriguingly
different from the Ramey EVAR specification and may suggest the stimulative effect
of news on fiscal spending. Also, they seem to indicate that revisions of expectations
affect agents’ behaviour in real-time. However, the low statistical significance of the
IRFs also points to the high level of noise contained in this alternative measure for
expectations. See Ricco (2013) who uses a refined measure for fiscal news and reports
consistent results.
4.4 Subsample Instability
Finally, we examine the issue of sample instability of dynamic responses to fiscal shocks
that has been highlighted by numerous studies. A common finding using US data is
state and local spending also deliver almost identical results.
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that the government spending multipliers vary depending on the sample studied (e.g.,
Perotti (2008), Ramey (2011b), Hall (2009)). This instability could be caused either
by the presence of structural breaks (e.g., credit market developments or changes in
the fiscal-monetary policy regime), or by variations in the composition of government
spending over time. Another possible source of instability may be omitted variables
and non-fundamentalness of structural shocks in the empirical model. Therefore, as
robustness check, we investigate potential sample instability by splitting our full sample
period of 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 into two subsamples, covering 1959Q1 to 1981Q4 and
1982Q1 to 2012Q1.
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to a shock in total government spending
over 24 quarters for the full sample as well as for the two subsamples. The plots also
show the posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68 and 0.9 levels. While the IRFs for the
Small VAR exhibit subsample instability, the Large VAR IRFs do not. In particular,
the Small VAR shows subsample instability across all the variables we study, including
GDP, durables and nondurables consumption, investment and real rates. Conversely, in
the Large VAR the IRFs for both subsamples are within the posterior coverage interval
at the 0.68 level for virtually all the horizons. The residual variation across subsamples
may be accounted for by the changing composition of government spending over time.21
The Large VAR responses to a shock in government spending are positive and signif-
icant for GDP, insignificant for nondurables and durables consumption and investment,
and negative and significant for real rates.22
Overall, these results for the Large VAR suggest that the previously reported sub-
sample instability is not due to structural changes but instead points to an omitted
variable problem. Also, given the consistency of results, the Large VAR can be used for
21Results are robust to the exclusion of the recent financial crisis. Also, the results for the subsample
1982Q1-2012Q1 are robust to the inclusion of additional potentially forward-looking variables, including
Conference Board CEO confidence index, Conference Board consumer confidence index, US housing
price index and NASDAQ returns. These variables are not available for the full sample.
22The subsample instability is also not present in the Large VAR for shocks to the components of
government spending.
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different subsamples without loss of validity (e.g., our analysis of government expecta-
tions over 1982Q2-2012Q1).
4.5 Discussion of Results
Our empirical results confirm the intuition that given the forward looking behaviour of
agents “information matters” in order to understand the effects of fiscal policy, and it
is necessary to enlarge the information set used in the econometric analysis to capture
the flow of information in the economy. Fiscal foresight can be effectively dealt with by
incorporating a rich macroeconomic dataset in a Large Bayesian Structural VAR.
Our findings indicate a possible direction to reconcile findings previously reported
in the literature. First, informational sufficiency tests show that small VARs using a
marginal approach are generally misspecified and prone to non-fundamentalness and
fiscal foresight issues. In fact, the fiscal shocks recovered from these models appear
to be forecastable using a larger information set, confirming Ramey’s criticism of this
approach. Proposed proxy variables for expectations of government spending still do
not fully account for the flow of macroeconomic information received by the agents, and
are again predictable using a broader set of variables. Second, our Large VAR is robust
across identifications of fiscal shocks: structural recursive and expectation augmented
specifications deliver the same results. Furthermore, the recovered shocks appear to
be true fiscal innovations, lending credibility to the use of Large BVARs as a suitable
tool for fiscal policy analysis. Finally, the stability of our results over different samples
provides strong indication of the robustness of our findings, explaining the previously
reported instability as an omitted variables artifact.
Our approach suffers from limitations largely common to the SVAR and EVAR liter-
ature. First, using a static linear VAR approach, we estimate time-invariant and linear
(marginally constant and symmetric with respect to the sign of the shock) government
multipliers. Therefore, we implicitly assume through our choice of the econometric
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model that government spending multipliers are independent of the state of the econ-
omy, do not change with the magnitude of the shock, and that positive and negative
shocks impinge on the economy in a symmetric way (a thoughtful discussion on this
point can be found in Parker (2011)).
Second, another potential issue is related to what Perotti (2011) calls the “variance
problem”. In some components of government spending there is limited variation over
the sample which reduces the precision of the estimated multipliers as indicated by the
relatively large coverage bands (see for example, the discussion in Hall (2009) and Barro
and Redlick (2009)). The precision of our estimates is in line with previous results on
fiscal shocks in the VAR literature. We believe that results from natural experiments
that aim to bridge the gap between microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches
provide relevant complementary evidence (e.g., in Acconcia et al. (2011); Nakamura
and Steinsson (2011); Wilson (2010)).
Third, we use identification schemes that are essentially recursive, with the shocks
always ordered first. We believe this strategy is largely sensible and is chosen with the
aim of assessing previous findings with the SVAR and EVAR approaches that apply
this methodology in different settings. However, this assumption of the exogeneity of
government spending with respect to contemporaneous shocks to other macroeconomic
variables could be incorrect. In particular, for state and local consumption (more so
than for investment), the balanced budget requirement may induce pro-cyclicality (see
Clemens and Miran (2012)). This issue is likely to be more pronounced for large business
cycle shocks like the recent recession. We note that our results are robust to the exclusion
of this sample period.
Finally, it is worth emphasising that government spending multipliers should not be
thought of as deep structural parameters of the economy. In fact, there is no single
government spending multiplier and its value is likely to depend on the country, the
economic phase, the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy regimes in place, the
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way the spending if financed, and the degree of openness of the economy (e.g. Woodford
(2011); Ilzetzki et al. (2013); Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012); Hall (2009); Favero
and Giavazzi (2007)). Our IRFs and estimated multipliers should be interpreted as
statistical averages over largely different economic conditions and policies.
5 Conclusions
In examining the effects of government spending as an active fiscal policy instrument,
we make two main contributions in this paper. First, we show that it is possible to
meaningfully identify government spending shocks using an expanded information set
and Bayesian VAR techniques. We document that fiscal shocks identified using standard
recursive fiscal SVARs and EVARs suffer from informational insufficiency. In fact, fiscal
innovations identified using these models are likely to have been anticipated by economic
agents, and are forecastable using a larger information set. In contrast, Bayesian VAR
techniques with a rich dataset yield multipliers and IRFs that are stable across samples
and identifications, overcoming issues of fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness.
Second, we estimate fiscal multipliers for different components of government spend-
ing at federal and state and local level, and uncover significant heterogeneity in the
responses of macroeconomic variables. While aggregate government spending does not
appear to produce a strong stimulative effect, federal non-defense investment, and state
and local consumption and investment components generally have output multipliers
well above unity. These findings may help to inform the current fiscal policy debate.
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Figure 1: Large and Small VAR (1959Q1:2012Q1). This figure presents the impulse
response functions to a shock in Government Consumption and Investment. Each chart shows
the Large VAR response for the period 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 as a solid line with shaded posterior
coverage intervals at the 0.68 and 0.9 level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for
the Small VAR for the same period.
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Figure 2: Large and Small VAR – Government Consumption Components
(1959Q1:2012Q1). This figure presents the impulse response functions to a shock in a
specified component of government consumption. The left, middle and right columns of plots
depict the responses to a shock in federal defense consumption, federal non-defense consump-
tion, and state and local consumption, respectively. Each chart shows the Large VAR response
for the period 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals at
the 0.68 and 0.9 level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the Small VAR for
the same period.
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Figure 3: Large and Small VAR – Government Investment Components
(1959Q1:2012Q1). This figure presents the impulse response functions to a shock in a
specified component of government investment. The left, middle and right columns of plots
depict the responses to a shock in federal defense investment, federal non-defense investment,
and state and local investment, respectively. Each chart shows the Large VAR response for
the period 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals at the
0.68 and 0.9 level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the Small VAR for the
same period.
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Figure 4: Federal Spending SVAR and EVAR (1982Q1:2012Q1). This figure presents
the impulse response functions to a shock in federal spending and federal spending forecasts.
The left, middle and right columns of plots depict the responses to a shock in federal spending,
federal spending forecast error, and federal spending expectation revision, respectively. Each
chart shows the Large VAR response for the period 1982Q1 to 2012Q1 as a solid line with
shaded posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68 and 0.9 level. The dashed line in each chart is
the response for the Small VAR for the same period.
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Figure 5: Government Consumption and Investment Shocks for Subsamples. The
subsample 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 is plotted as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals
at the 0.68 and 0.9 level. The dashed line and dotted lines in each chart are the responses for
the periods 1982Q1 to 2012Q1, and 1959Q1 to 1981Q4, respectively. The left column of plots
shows the Small VAR responses and the right column presents the Large VAR plots for each
subsample.
42
Government Spending Cumulative Multipliers for GDP
Cumulative Multipliers
1σ Coverage Bands
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
State & Local Investment
 
 
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
−1
0
1
2
3
4
State & Local Consumption
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0
10
20
30
40
Fed Non−defense Investment
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
Fed Non−defense Consumption
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
Fed Defense Investment
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Fed Defense Consumption
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0
0.5
1
Govt Consumption and Investment
Figure 6: Government Spending Cumulative Multipliers for GDP. These figures plot
the ratios of the cumulative increase in the net present value of GDP and the cumulative
increase in the net present value of indicated government spending component.
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Table 1: Government Spending Decomposition (1960 – 2010)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Government Spending ($ bn) 870.5 1,233.6 1,358.6 1,863.7 2,097.9 2,605.8
Government Spending (%)
Federal Government 53.8 46.7 40.9 42.8 33.3 41.3
Defense Consumption Expenditures 40.7 36.5 26.6 27.2 19.2 23.4
Defense Gross Investment 5.0 2.6 2.3 4.0 2.4 4.2
Non-defense Consumption Expend. 8.2 9.5 12.1 10.3 10.1 11.8
Non-defense Gross Investment 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.9
State and Local Government 45.2 53.0 59.3 57.0 66.7 58.9
S&L Consumption Expenditures 34.5 42.0 49.9 47.2 54.0 48.3
S&L Gross Investment 10.0 10.4 9.5 9.8 12.7 10.6
Federal Government Spending (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Functional Decomposition)
General Public Service 4.2 4.5 6.4 5.3 4.6 5.6
National Defense 84.6 79.6 68.5 73.2 65.0 66.6
Public Order and Safety 0.5 0.7 1.5 2.0 4.6 4.9
Transportation 2.0 2.2 3.0 2.6 3.3 3.1
Economic Affairs (excl. Transport) 6.0 7.8 11.4 9.5 11.1 8.9
Housing and Community Services 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2
Health 2.5 3.6 6.2 5.9 8.5 7.7
Recreation and Culture 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5
Education 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.7
Income Security 0.5 1.0 2.2 1.1 1.5 1.7
State and Local Govt. Spending (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Functional Decomposition)
General Public Service 6.7 8.4 10.2 11.4 11.6 11.6
Public Order and Safety 11.7 11.2 13.1 14.5 15.2 15.9
Transportation 23.4 18.8 15.5 14.2 13.5 11.8
Economic Affairs (excl. Transport) 5.2 4.9 5.1 4.0 3.5 3.6
Housing and Community Services 5.3 4.5 4.2 3.9 2.9 3.4
Health 3.7 3.6 3.5 4.2 2.9 4.1
Recreation and Culture 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0
Education 40.8 43.5 42.9 41.9 43.6 43.3
Income Security 1.6 2.7 3.7 3.9 4.6 4.4
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Tables Section 3
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Table 2: Multipliers for GDP, Consumption and Investment. Standard errors are
italicised. Inv is Investment and Dur, ND, and Svs are durables, nondurables and services
consumption, respectively. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10 percent,
5 percent and 1 percent levels.
GDP Dur ND Svs Inv
O
n
Im
p
a
c
t
Govt. Spend 0.71*** (0.19) 0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04) -0.10 (0.14)
Defense Cons 0.88*** (0.32) -0.02 (0.08) 0.03 (0.05) -0.05 (0.08) -0.01 (0.23)
Defense Inv 1.05 (0.71) -0.03 (0.18) -0.09 (0.12) -0.15 (0.17) 0.08 (0.51)
Nondefense Cons -0.35 (0.41) -0.14 (0.10) 0.00 (0.06) -0.03 (0.10) -0.70** (0.29)
Nondefense Inv 4.70 (3.08) -0.94 (0.72) -0.31 (0.51) 0.29 (0.70) 2.15 (2.25)
State & Local Cons -0.36 (0.97) -0.03 (0.23) 0.27* (0.15) 0.53** (0.22) -1.66** (0.68)
State & Local Inv 2.63*** (0.56) 0.47*** (0.14) -0.01 (0.09) -0.02 (0.13) 0.46 (0.42)
A
ft
e
r
4
Q
Govt. Spend 0.51 (0.34) -0.03 (0.07) 0.04 (0.05) -0.05 (0.09) -0.19 (0.22)
Defense Cons 0.65 (0.57) -0.01 (0.12) 0.05 (0.09) -0.09 (0.15) -0.08 (0.38)
Defense Inv -2.57* (1.33) -0.64** (0.27) -0.38* (0.21) -0.70** (0.34) -2.01** (0.89)
Nondefense Cons -0.20 (0.75) -0.11 (0.15) 0.00 (0.12) 0.06 (0.19) -0.63 (0.51)
Nondefense Inv 6.58 (5.48) -0.17 (1.07) 0.32 (0.87) 1.04 (1.39) 1.70 (3.60)
State & Local Cons 0.91 (1.66) 0.32 (0.32) 0.61** (0.25) 0.76* (0.42) -0.78 (1.12)
State & Local Inv 2.35** (1.03) 0.19 (0.20) 0.08 (0.16) -0.17 (0.25) 0.78 (0.69)
A
ft
e
r
8
Q
Govt. Spend 0.41 (0.46) -0.05 (0.09) 0.04 (0.08) -0.05 (0.13) -0.17 (0.27)
Defense Cons 0.08 (0.83) -0.10 (0.16) 0.01 (0.13) -0.11 (0.23) -0.36 (0.49)
Defense Inv -3.23 (2.08) -0.65* (0.39) -0.48 (0.33) -0.93* (0.56) -2.07* (1.23)
Nondefense Cons 0.03 (1.09) -0.09 (0.21) 0.06 (0.18) 0.05 (0.31) -0.31 (0.64)
Nondefense Inv 14.91* (8.13) 0.86 (1.55) 1.45 (1.30) 2.65 (2.18) 7.07 (4.82)
State & Local Cons 3.81 (2.32) 0.66 (0.43) 0.92** (0.36) 1.43** (0.64) 1.40 (1.39)
State & Local Inv 1.51 (1.44) 0.13 (0.28) 0.04 (0.23) -0.26 (0.40) 0.29 (0.85)
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
4
Q Govt. Spend 0.58** (0.27) -0.01 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04) -0.05 (0.07) -0.17 (0.18)
Defense Cons 0.79* (0.46) 0.01 (0.10) 0.04 (0.07) -0.08 (0.11) -0.06 (0.32)
Defense Inv -1.02 (1.22) -0.43 (0.26) -0.32 (0.20) -0.51* (0.31) -1.18 (0.85)
Nondefense Cons -0.51 (0.73) -0.17 (0.15) -0.03 (0.11) 0.04 (0.18) -0.97* (0.51)
Nondefense Inv 5.51 (4.76) -0.63 (0.98) 0.05 (0.77) 0.60 (1.16) 1.54 (3.25)
State & Local Cons 0.09 (1.08) 0.09 (0.22) 0.35** (0.17) 0.50* (0.26) -1.06 (0.74)
State & Local Inv 3.03*** (0.93) 0.38* (0.19) 0.07 (0.14) -0.12 (0.22) 0.80 (0.65)
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
8
Q Govt. Spend 0.53 (0.35) -0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06) -0.05 (0.09) -0.18 (0.22)
Defense Cons 0.56 (0.61) -0.03 (0.12) 0.04 (0.10) -0.09 (0.16) -0.16 (0.40)
Defense Inv -2.68 (1.85) -0.67* (0.37) -0.49 (0.30) -0.86* (0.48) -2.14* (1.19)
Nondefense Cons -0.30 (1.06) -0.15 (0.21) 0.01 (0.17) 0.06 (0.28) -0.83 (0.69)
Nondefense Inv 10.28 (6.80) -0.01 (1.34) 0.67 (1.09) 1.55 (1.73) 4.03 (4.34)
State & Local Cons 1.18 (1.34) 0.27 (0.26) 0.49** (0.21) 0.72** (0.35) -0.21 (0.87)
State & Local Inv 2.82** (1.32) 0.31 (0.26) 0.07 (0.21) -0.20 (0.34) 0.74 (0.85)
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Table 3: Multipliers Mean Differences Test. This table reports t-statistics for pair-
wise differences in government spending multipliers for GDP. The asterisks *, **, *** denote
statistical significance at two-tailed 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
O
n
Im
p
a
c
t
Govt. Spend (1)
Defense Cons (2) 0.45
Defense Inv (3) 0.47 0.22
Nondefense Cons (4) -2.35** -2.36** -1.71*
Nondefense Inv (5) 1.29 1.24 1.16 1.63
State & Local Cons (6) -1.08 -1.21 -1.17 -0.01 -1.57
State & Local Inv (7) 3.25*** 2.72*** 1.75* 4.31*** -0.66 2.67***
A
ft
e
r
4
Q
Govt. Spend (1)
Defense Cons (2) 0.22
Defense Inv (3) -2.25** -2.23**
Nondefense Cons (4) -0.86 -0.90 1.55
Nondefense Inv (5) 1.11 1.08 1.62 1.23*
State & Local Cons (6) 0.24 0.15 1.64 0.61 -0.99
State & Local Inv (7) 1.70* 1.45 2.93*** 2.00** -0.76 0.74
A
ft
e
r
8
Q
Govt. Spend (1)
Defense Cons (2) -0.35
Defense Inv (3) -1.71* -1.48
Nondefense Cons (4) -0.32 -0.03 1.39
Nondefense Inv (5) 1.78* 1.81* 2.16** 1.81*
State & Local Cons (6) 1.44 1.52 2.26** 1.47 -1.31
State & Local Inv (7) 0.73 0.86 1.87* 0.82 -1.62 -0.84
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
4
Q Govt. Spend
Defense Cons 0.40
Defense Inv -1.27 -1.38
Nondefense Cons -1.40 -1.50 0.35
Nondefense Inv 1.04 0.99 1.33 1.25
State & Local Cons -0.44 -0.60 0.67 0.46 -1.11
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